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What Does the Case of Max Mosley Tell Us About Leadership?
The value of leadership has profound implications in terms of both business and politics, and in this respect the two are often considered interchangeable. In both cases, clarity of vision and determination are central to most accepted theories, and great leaders have tended to be those who were able to implement a vision that proved to be the right choice. However, the fine line between determination and dictatorship has been discussed by a number of theorists, and as Richard Hedges notes "a greater leader is almost by definition a dictator, yet this latter term is often considered completely off limits... (so) it has to be dressed up in hyperbole and double-speak" (Hedges, 2002, p. 89). One particularly controversial leader in recent years has been Max Mosley, head of the Federation International de l'Automobile (FIA), the governing body of both road safety and motor racing. Mosley's tactics have been heavily scrutinised, and he has been regularly accused of using political methods to settle personal scores. Furthermore, a number of scandals have surrounded Mosley's tenure at the head of the FIA, leading to calls for his resignation. However, he has remained in his post for almost two decades, and his turbulent period in charge provides a number of valuable lessons concerning the key qualities required for a successful leader.
The decision by Mosley to stand down as FIA President in 2009 came after a period of unprecedented turbulence that has seen both professional scandal (the 'News of the World' expose) and personal tragedy (the death of his son). Mosley has been one of the most divisive FIA president's of all time, even more so than his controversial predecessor Jean-Marie Balestre, yet despite this divisiveness the FIA has remained strong and Formula One, despite occasional threats otherwise, remains united. The scandal about Mosley's personal life, in which he was accused of engaging in Nazi-themed sex games (an accusation he successfully challenged in court), threatened to end his reign as one of motorsport's most powerful men, yet he emerged stronger and, if anything, more determined than ever to implement his vision for the sport (which was arguably counter to the vision being proposed by many of the major car manufacturers). While Mosley had previously been seen to be a strong example of the Great Man leadership style, the sex scandal and subsequent events have shown his leadership style to be far more sophisticated and complex.
At the heart of the Max Mosley story is the question of his parentage, and while it may be polite to step around this issue, an essay such as this must tackle the subject head on. Mosley's father, Oswald Mosley, was the leader of the British Union of Fascists, and has long been associated in the public image with attempts by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi's to establish a fascist government in the UK. There has never been even the slightest indication that Mosley shares any of his father's beliefs, and it has been acknowledged by a number of writers that "for Mosley, the nature of his parents' fame was such that it probably ruined his chances at the career for which he would most likely have been best suited, namely British politics" (King, 2008, p. 108). In fact, many commentators share the view that Mosley would have been a natural parliamentary politician and may well have risen to the role of Prime Minister, were it not for the unfortunate associations of his surname. It was partly for these reasons that the sex scandal involving alleged Nazi role-playing was so damaging, since it seemed to confirm suspicions that Mosley could never escape the shadow of his parents. That Mosley was able to bat away such suspicions so successfully was down to his refusal to submit to what he saw as a carefully orchestrated smear campaign.
Mosley has never publicly stated who he believes arranged for his private life to be made so devastatingly public, but there are strong indications that he knows the individual to be part of the Formula One community. Mosley certainly has no shortage of enemies within the Formula One paddock, and the past few years have seen many private battles that have occasionally given the impression that individuals have been using the sport in order to try to bring each other down. In 2008 and 2009, there have been scandals surrounding the McLaren and Renault teams that have significantly harmed the reputations of those teams' leading figures, Ron Dennis and Flavio Briatore respectively, and some have argued that it's no coincidence that these two figures have been among the strongest critics of Mosley over the past decade. There is nothing in the public domain to suggest that either Dennis or Briatore was remotely involved in the sting against Mosley that led to the scandal, yet the atmosphere of scores being settled has been remarked upon time and again. There have even been accusations that the politics of Formula One are becoming more important than the racing.
However, it's also possible to argue that the recent tumult in Formula One has been as much about Mosley forcing through his singular vision for the sport as it is about his determination to seek revenge. Mosley has always been fundamentally opposed to the domination of the sport by manufacturer teams, and prefers the spirit of the pre-90's when most teams were made up of privateer constructors allied to major manufacturer engine deals. Until the 1990's, only Ferrari and Renault had really shown any success, in the modern age, as wholly-manufacturer teams. However, by 2008 the grid contained not only the Ferrari and Renault teams, but also BMW, Toyota and Honda. Only Williams and Force India remained in the classic mould of privateer constructors building their own cars and sourcing engines from a manufacturer, and this business model had, in the views of some people, been dealt a potentially fatal blow with the ruling that teams could buy off-the-peg chassis from other teams. Mosley felt that this situation was untenable, since the major manufacturers would surely pull out when Formula One was no longer in their interests, leaving little left but a few struggling privateer teams.
It's arguable, therefore, that the majority of Mosley's work has been aimed at bringing the sport back to the 1990's framework, whereby costs were relatively low and constructors were autonomous units. The 'manufacturer era' of the early twenty-first century had seen massive amounts of money, sometimes as much as £300m per year, spent by manufacturers such as Ferrari and Toyota, who were determined to buy success for their brands. For Ferrari, this strategy paid off as Michael Schumacher took five consecutive drivers' championships between 2000 and 2004; for Toyota, however, there has not even been a single race victory, clearly showing that money alone doesn't buy success in Formula One. Furthermore, Mosley's fears have been shown to be substantially correct: in late 2008, the Honda team unexpectedly withdrew from Formula One, and in 2009 the BMW team has announced its intention to do the same. There remain question marks about Toyota's future involvement, and Renault are expected to quit if they're found guilty in the Singapore race-fixing scandal. Clearly, therefore, in this regard Max Mosley has been shown to have been correct.
Many of Mosley's critics, however, are more concerned with his style of governance rather than the substance of his views. While many within Formula One agree that a dependence on manufacturer teams would be highly dangerous, Mosley's methods of pushing through his reforms have been questioned. In 2010, Formula One will have three (or perhaps even four) new teams, yet there are questions concerning these teams' abilities to prepare a car in time for the season opener in March. Furthermore, there are arguments over the proposed budgets for 2010. Mosley wanted to get the teams to agree to a £40m limit, which is less than a third of the budget for even the smallest and most frugal of the 2009 teams. After a stand-off which saw the majority of the existing teams threaten to leave Formula One, Mosley eventually accepted a figure of around £100m for the 2010 cap, with the £40m cap postponed until 2011. A number of critics have pointed out that Mosley's initial stance was impossible: he couldn't expect teams with 300 employee apiece to suddenly sack up to half of those employees, since for one thing the redundancy pay-offs would have been huge. It's clear, therefore, that Mosley's tactic here, as so often in the past, was to take an unreasonable position and then 'negotiate' to the position he was really after in the first place.
Ultimately, Max Mosley's time as president of the FIA has seen dramatic increases in road safety and, within the highly political sport of Formula One, improvements in both safety and, since 2008, sustainable technologies. Although the KERS (Kinetic Energy Recovery System) adopted by Formula One for 2009 has proved to be less successful than expected, it's nevertheless expected to become a pivotal 'green' technology in the next few years, and Formula One has been pivotal in developing lighter and more robust KERS systems. The manner of KERS' implementation, however, has been heavily criticised, and it's notable that no teams are expected to run with KERS in 2010. Mosley's core intentions - reducing the reliance on manufacturers; improving safety; and improving Formula One's 'green' credentials - have gathered much support, but his methods of achieving them have been consistently attacked. Nevertheless, Mosley will leave office in 2009 with many of his objectives having been achieved, and it's clear that his leadership style, while arguably dictatorial (thought dressed up as democracy), has been effective. It may even be the case that Mosley is a perfect example of how dictatorial leadership styles are the most effective, provided there is a sufficiently strong governance procedures to back them up.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brooks Jr., Fred (1975). 'The Mythical Man Month'. London: Addison Wesley
Cockburn, Alistair (2001). 'Leadership Styles'. New York: Menzies Publishing Ltd.
Hedges, Richard (2002). 'Leadership: The Popular and the Unpopular'. Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks
King, Tony (2008). 'Famous Parents: How the Children of Well-Known Figures Struggled To Escape Their Parents' Shadow'. London: Aldgate Press

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